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Merchant and regulated transmission: theory, evidence 
and policy 
 
Stephen Littlechild 1 
 
 
5 October 2011 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Electricity transmission used to be classified as a natural monopoly that needed 
to be regulated. Merchant transmission challenged this. Throughout its brief but 
eventful life, merchant transmission has been and continues to be controversial, 
in both theory and practice. Regulators internationally are now considering what 
role it should play in the provision of additional transmission, and what 
modifications to the regulatory framework are thereby indicated. 
 
With the advent of electricity competition, explorations of optimal transmission 
pricing policy led to financial transmission rights and the possibility of 
competitive provision of transmission, financed by locational price differentials. 
(Hogan 1992, Chao and Peck 1996, Bushnell and Stoft 1996, 1997) Suggestions 
were made for the regulation of transmission companies. (Léautier 2000, 2001, 
Vogelsang 2001) However, changes in transmission technology were argued to 
shift the balance of advantage in favour of a market-based approach. (Rotger and 
Felder 2001) Hogan (1999, 2003) suggested that only ‘large and lumpy’ 
transmission investments should be regulated, with everything else left to the 
market. More recently, Hogan et al (2010) proposed a new regulatory 
mechanism aimed at combining the best properties of the merchant and 
incentive regulation approaches. 
 
Joskow and Tirole (2005) (henceforth J&T) argued that the conditions required 
for merchant transmission investment to be optimal were not likely to be met in 
practice. Problematic aspects included wholesale market power, lumpiness of 
investment, strategic behaviour and difficulties of coordination. Admittedly the 
‘regulated Transco’ model had various inefficiencies in practice, but it was 
unlikely that policymakers could rely primarily on the merchant model. Joskow 
(2005) argued that merchant transmission might be a complement but not a 
                                                 
1 sclittlechild@tanworth.mercianet.co.uk 
Emeritus Professor, University of Birmingham, and Fellow, Judge Business School, University of 
Cambridge. I am grateful to Bill Hogan for alerting me to recent US developments and to Alan 
Moran and a referee for comments.  
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substitute for regulated transmission, was likely to make only a very small 
contribution, and efforts to debate its role had been a distraction.  
 
European economists entering the debate took a more pragmatic and eclectic 
stance. Brunekreeft et al (2005) suggested that different solutions might be 
appropriate in different circumstances. For example, merchant transmission 
would be more viable in the US, with nodal pricing and financial transmission 
rights, whereas zonal pricing in Europe and Australia would restrict merchant 
investment to interconnectors between adjacent markets, with remaining 
investment being carried out by a regulated Transco. (See also Brunekreeft 
2005) Rious (2006) suggested that merchant investment would be efficient 
where economies of scale were small relative to the size of market, where DC 
transmission had a cost advantage over AC transmission, and where differential 
prices could expect to be maintained, as in New York but not Australia. 
Competition for the market, along lines suggested by Demsetz, could be useful in 
radial but not meshed networks.  
 
In 1998 two merchant interconnectors were proposed in Australia (DirectLink 
and Murraylink), which came into operation in 2000 and 2002, respectively. But 
both subsequently applied for transfer from merchant to regulated status, in 
Murraylink’s case just two weeks after it came into commercial operation. Other 
merchant investments were projected, both in the US and in Europe, some of 
which have gone ahead. Their revenues typically derive from long-term 
contractual arrangements with regulated entities rather than from spot-market 
arbitrage between locational price differentials. Joskow suggested that they were 
more properly described as ‘private initiatives’, a useful term that we shall use 
herein. 
 
Léautier and Thelen (2009) surveyed 16 restructured jurisdictions. They 
suggested that merchant investment has played a very limited role so far 
because (1) upgrades to existing capacity are not candidates while new 
interconnectors face regulatory and environmental barriers, and (2) merchant 
investment is not financially viable since a higher return is required for the risk 
involved, and construction reduces the price differentials that are the basis of 
potential revenue.  
 
The pressures for transmission expansion and the option of merchant or private 
initiative investment are causing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) to reconsider its traditional open access transmission policy. (FERC 
2011a) EU regulators too, faced with ineffective unbundling and insufficient new 
interconnectors, are allowing incumbent transcos exemption from EC rules on 
third party access in order to encourage investment. De Hauteclocque and Rious 
(2009) urge instead that dominant generators be allowed to make merchant 
investments, relying where necessary on the powers of the new Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to address any competition concerns.  
 
There seems to be common ground on the likely need for more transmission 
investment and the possibility that some form of merchant investment could 
play a role somewhere. However, there is apparently little agreement among 
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economists as to whether this could or should be a relatively small or large role, 
and what kinds of policies are best suited to delivering this. The analytic 
literature is somewhat separate from the papers debating concrete issues of 
policy, and there is relatively little incorporation of empirical evidence into the 
theoretical papers. 
 
Most of the analytic papers seek to characterise an optimal solution and to 
establish whether merchant transmission involves a departure from this. 
However, many of the features that are problematic for merchant transmission 
present problems for regulated transmission too. There is an alternative 
‘comparative institutions’ approach (Coase 1955, Demsetz 1969, Kahn 1979) 
which has recently been powerfully expounded by Joskow (2009, 2010). This 
accepts that market and regulated approaches are both imperfect, and tries to 
identify and compare the pros and cons of each approach.  In this way the 
evidence of experience to date is more easily considered and evaluated, in order 
to inform a general policy stance. 
 
The present paper applies this approach to merchant and regulated transmission 
- taking merchant transmission in the broad sense, to include ‘private initiatives’. 
It seeks to identify what have been the main market failures and regulatory 
failures, as predicted in theory and experienced in practice. It first examines 
experience with merchant and regulated transmission in Australia, where there 
is a direct comparison between the two types of interconnectors. It then 
examines experience in Argentina, whose ‘beneficiaries pay’ approach to 
transmission expansion has recently been adopted (with modifications) in the 
US. This sheds light on the question whether transactions costs are an obstacle to 
merchant transmission reaching an efficient outcome. The paper concludes by 
considering some implications for the general direction of future policy. 
 
 
2. The potential imperfections of market and regulated 
            transmission 
 
The concept and main forms of market failure are well-known. J&T suggest 
various types of imperfection that they argue to be inconsistent with reaching an 
efficient outcome in the specific context of merchant transmission. Some of these 
imperfections apply also to regulated investment. For example, market power in 
the importing wholesale market can increase prices there and over-incentivise 
investment in transmission. But this is equally a problem for regulated 
transmission seeking to build the ‘efficient’ amount of transmission. In both 
cases, proponents of new transmission lines have to conjecture what factors 
have led to observed prices in the past and judge how far these factors will 
continue to obtain in the future. There seems no reason to believe that regulated 
interconnectors are systematically better at analysing these factors than 
merchant interconnectors.2  
                                                 
2 Similar arguments apply to other potential imperfections such as the stochastic properties of 
transmission capacity and the associated definitions of property rights, network operator 
behaviour, and the implications of loop flow. These factors may be inconsistent with the 
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The potential imperfections of merchant transmission that cause most concern 
seem to be the following: 
1) market power associated with a transmission expansion, reflected in 
lower capacity and output, delayed investment and higher prices; 
2) lumpiness, leading to lower capacity and output because of the need to 
cover costs by locational differentials in prices; 
3) imperfect information, resulting in misjudgements about what, where and 
when to build transmission; 
4) transactions costs, resulting in inability to address problems associated 
with coordination and the aggregation of stakeholder preferences, 
negotiations between market participants, network deepening 
investments, gaming between interdependent entities and projects, and 
the separation of ownership and control; 
5) long lead times and lack of forward markets and commitment, leading to 
difficulty of financing merchant interconnectors, lack of credibility vis a 
vis shorter projects, and regulatory uncertainty and opportunism. 
 
J&T say that “In principle, a regulated Transco model can deal directly with 
issues associated with lumpy investment, market power in wholesale power 
markets, gaming behaviour of merchant investors and stochastic attributes of 
transmission capacity.” (p. 262) But they immediately note that whether it can 
do so in practice is another matter.3 In a more general context, Joskow (2010) 
identifies five types of potential regulatory imperfection. We may combine these 
suggested regulatory failures as follows: 
6) imperfect information - about the regulated firms and also about the 
customers to be protected - leading to misjudgements about when, where 
and how to build transmission; 
7) bureaucratic costs, time-consuming decision-making and problems of 
multiple regulatory jurisdictions; 
8) less incentive to efficient construction costs, and conservatism with 
respect to new technologies and new and better ways of regulating; 
9) interest group capture and political influence; 
10) the possibility of inadequate resources to do the regulatory job well and 
consequent reliance on regulated firms. 
 
How significant have these ten potential imperfections been in practice? 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
assumptions of the formal models used to justify merchant transmission, and they may be 
challenging problems in practice. But it is not clear that they are differentially more challenging 
for merchant than for regulated transmission. 
3 “However, a regulated Transco model will necessarily confront inefficiencies resulting from 
asymmetric information and political interference in planning and investment processes and may be 
less effective than a merchant model in providing the high powered incentives that lead to the 
identification of innovative transmission investment options, construction costs minimization and 
efficient tradeoffs between generation and transmission investments.” (p. 262) 
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3. Regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia 
 
The next few sections draw on ideas and material previously set out at some 
length (and, I now realise, buried in a forest of somewhat impenetrable detail) in 
two working papers on regulated and merchant interconnectors in Australia. 
(Littlechild 2003, 2004)4 These papers contain documented sources for the 
statements made below. 
 
Electricity privatisation and competition began to develop in Australia during the 
1990s, albeit on a somewhat piecemeal basis with varying enthusiasm in the 
different states. In 1996 a National Market Management Company (NEMMCO) 
was set up to be the short-term operator of the proposed National Electricity 
Market (NEM).  
 
In 1997, the New South Wales (NSW) and Queensland governments announced a 
new regulated line between those two states, called QNI. This was an overground 
alternating current (AC) interconnector over a distance of about 550 km with a 
design capacity of 1000 MW south to NSW and 750 MW north to Queensland.  
 
In 1998 a new entrant TransEnergie Australia (a subsidiary of the transmission 
entity of the Canadian publicly-owned Hydro-Quebec) and its partner Country 
Energy (a state-owned corporation in NSW), proposed an unregulated (i.e. 
merchant) interconnector between the two states, called DirectLink. This was an 
underground high voltage direct current (HVDC) line, over a much shorter 
distance of 65 km, and with a much smaller capacity of 180 MW.   
 
DirectLink began commercial operation in July 2000. QNI commenced 
commercial operation in February 2001. 
 
Over a similar period, there were also discussions between NSW and South 
Australia (SA). In 1996, the respective state-owned electricity entities Transgrid 
and ETSA agreed to explore the feasibility of an interconnector between those 
states. In June 1998 NEMMCO decided that their proposed regulated 
interconnector called SANI did not pass the prescribed regulatory test. SA 
withdrew. On 29 October 1998 TransGrid submitted a unilateral application for a 
revised regulatory interconnector called SNI.  
 
On 28 April 1999 TransEnergie Australia announced its intention to build an 
HVDC merchant interconnector called Murraylink between Victoria and SA. It 
was shorter in length than SNI but along essentially the same route (the termini 
in Victoria and NSW being close together).  
 
                                                 
4 The author was invited by Murraylink and TransEnergie to comment on part of the regulatory 
process in Australia in 2001, and was called by these companies to testify in the August 2002 
hearing before the National Electricity Tribunal. Neither Murraylink nor TransEnergie provided 
financial support for subsequent work or for the writing of my 2003 and 2004 papers, and they 
are not responsible for the views expressed therein or here. 
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Murraylink (now jointly owned by TransEnergie and a Canadian private 
company SNC-Lavalin) opened for commercial operation on 4 October 2002. SNI 
did not go ahead. 
 
4. Potential failures of Australian merchant interconnectors  
 
a) Lumpiness and market power 
 
Lumpiness does not seem to have been a factor limiting the size (or timing) of 
either merchant interconnector. Murraylink’s 220MW capacity was not 
significantly less than SNI’s 250MW. Directlink’s 180MW capacity was 
significantly smaller than QNI’s 1000/750MW. However, it was presumably 
constructed on the assumption that QNI would go ahead, rather than as a 
substitute, so it was actually only a marginal increase in total interconnector 
capacity. Both merchant interconnector capacities would be considered small 
compared to that of a new generation plant. 
 
Did Murraylink have any market power? Did it delay investment, or restrict 
capacity or output, and consequently increase prices? For the most part, the 
answer to these questions seems to be No. As a new entrant, Murraylink had no 
interest in delaying investment to benefit incumbents. On the contrary, it 
deliberately incurred an extra cost to underground the line in order to avoid 
environmental objections and thereby speed up construction.  
 
Three lines of argument and evidence as to Murraylink’s market power were put 
before the National Electricity Tribunal. 1) That it would have an 18% share of 
flexible supplies in SA - which it never did. 2) That there was a constraint on gas-
fired generation in SA - which was soon disproved by new entry. 3) That a 
consultancy study (commissioned by the incumbent TransGrid) suggested that in 
the absence of a contract with users Murraylink would reduce its flow by an 
average of 15-16% - but the same study showed that if Murraylink were 75% 
contracted, which was its stated policy and consistent with the policies of 
merchant generators generally, the average reduction in flow would be 
negligible (about ½ % of its capacity). 
 
In the event, Murraylink was not able to sign any contracts and during its first 
year of operation its overall load factor was only about 14%. This was lower than 
the 50% load factors of two regulated interconnectors in Australia (QNI and 
Heywood). This suggests that, compared to a regulated interconnector financed 
by other transmission revenues, Murraylink did restrict flow in an attempt to 
maintain adequate price differentials in order to cover its costs of construction 
and operation. However, it failed: it could not make enough revenue to cover its 
costs. There is certainly no evidence that Murraylink was able to restrict output 
sufficient to extract monopoly profit.  
 
Murraylink’s low load factor probably reflected the very limited scope for 
profitable trade. It has been estimated that “such interconnectors require 
sustained Pool price differentials of $12 - $15/MWh even at full utilisation, to 
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have a chance of earning a reasonable return on investment”5 A 1997 study by 
London Economics had predicted a generation capacity shortage in SA and 
concluded that an interconnector between SA and NSW was economic. Over the 
four years from 1996/97 to 1999/2000 the differentials between the yearly 
average prices for SA and Victoria had averaged $21 – sufficient to make the 
interconnector viable if it were operating at about two-thirds capacity utilisation 
and ignoring transmission losses. In 2000/01 the differential fell to $12, implying 
that Murraylink would only be viable if it were assumed to run at full capacity all 
the time, and again ignoring transmission losses.  
 
In the event, however, many of the assumptions of the 1997 study, including 
about capacity shortage in SA, were not fulfilled. In 2001/02 the differential 
between SA and Victoria fell to under $1. It averaged only about $6 from 2001 to 
2006 before reversing to -$6 in 2007.6 Such differentials are far below what 
Murraylink would need to cover all its costs, even with operation at full 
utilisation and zero transmission losses. And in practice these qualifications are 
significant: as noted Murraylink’s overall load factor was only 14% and in 2003 
its transmission losses were 6.9%. Ancillary services income was minor. Even if 
Murraylink could have been built without the additional cost of undergrounding, 
it would have had construction costs about double its prospective revenues. It is 
perhaps not surprising that Murraylink applied for conversion to regulated 
status on 18 October 2002. It was accepted as a regulated interconnector on 9 
October 2003.7 
 
Like Murraylink, DirectLink had no reason to delay investment. Like Murraylink, 
it had a low utilisation factor because it faced a significantly lower than needed 
average price differential. 8 Far from being able to restrict output to extract 
monopoly profit, it too made a loss. On 6 May 2004 DirectLink applied for 
transfer to regulated status, which was granted on 10 March 2006. 
 
b) Information, transactions costs and other factors 
 
It would seem that, in the case of both merchant interconnectors, TransEnergie 
Australia misjudged the market and had to exit at a loss. Why was this? Maybe 
                                                 
5 Booth (2003), p. 89. This is consistent with calculations made by the ACCC in 2003. $ figures for 
Australia refer to AUS$. 
6 Rious (2006) Fig 3 shows price differentials up to 2005/06 that are evidently calculated on a 
different basis but they equal $8/MWh on average, less than two-thirds of what would be 
required at full utilisation. He has different figures for the NSW-Queensland interconnector too, 
but the same conclusion. 
7 Interestingly, prices in SA significantly increased from 2007 onwards (following a generation 
asset swap, I am told). The differential increased to about $25 in 2008-2009, before dropping 
back to under $7 in 2010. 
8 The pool price differential between Queensland and NSW averaged about $18/MWh from 1998-
2000. “[A] sustained average pool price differential of about $11/MWh would be needed to allow 
the owners to achieve a full commercial return. And this is with full utilisation – more practical 
utilisation levels would require a higher average pool price differential. // But since QNI has been 
commissioned, the Queensland - NSW pool price differential has been only around $2/MWh in 
2001 and $8/MWh in 2002 - much less than that required to make DirectLink pay its way, given 
its actual low utilisation”.  Booth (2003), p.220. The differential was -$4 in 2003. Far from having 
full utilisation, DirectLink’s overall load factor was 15% in 2001, 8% in 2002 and 27% in 2003. 
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TransEnergie’s owner HydroQuebec and its partner Country Energy, as publicly 
owned utilities, were less sensitive to profit and loss than TransEnergie’s other 
partner SNC-Lavalin. However, investment in these two interconnectors 
presumably had wider benefits for TransEnergie in terms of acquiring and 
publicising expertise in a new technology with a view to future business.9 
Perhaps temporary operating losses were a price worth paying. Murraylink 
noted that it would not have invested had it not been for the opportunity to 
convert to regulated status, which it said helped to avoid ‘non-commercial 
market design risks’. Nonetheless, it would seem that imperfect information, in 
the form of over-optimistic estimates of generation shortages and future price 
differentials, played a part in the decision to build these merchant 
interconnectors. 
 
The transactions cost issues mentioned by J&T do not seem to have been a 
problem for either merchant interconnector. These were what J&T call network 
expansions (interconnectors between networks) rather than network deepening 
investments. There was no need to coordinate market participants or aggregate 
stakeholder preferences. There was no gaming with other merchant 
interconnectors or power stations. 
 
As regards the other factors mentioned, a long lead time with lack of forward 
markets and commitment was not an issue. In fact, the opposite was the case: the 
merchant interconnectors adopted a technology and design that minimised 
construction time and the possibility of delay due to environmental objections. 
Financing does not appear to have been a problem. There was no lack of 
credibility vis a vis shorter projects: any lack of credibility was on the part of the 
regulated interconnectors, one of which in the event was never built. Regulatory 
uncertainty and opportunism were indeed a problem for Murraylink to the 
extent that TransGrid persisted in proposing to build SNI despite growing 
evidence that it was uneconomic. Whether the then-regulatory body and appeal 
process would accept TransGrid’s arguments was also uncertain. But neither of 
these factors actually stopped or delayed Murraylink. More on this shortly. 
 
The evidence from Australia thus suggests that the decisions to build the two 
merchant interconnectors were questionable on commercial grounds. However, 
these interconnectors had essentially no market power. Nor were their 
developments characterised by the other potential market failures suggested by 
J&T. Far from building too little too late, the proponents built too much too soon - 
at least, too soon for their own good as operators. To the extent that the 
operating decisions can be taken on their own, apart from the desire to secure 
                                                 
9 DirectLink and Murraylink were two of the earliest HVDC transmission links constructed by 
TransEnergie. Murraylink was an innovative technology and concept, was of record length and 
constructed in record-breaking time, and won environmental awards. The company 
subsequently participated in three HVDC projects in the US (Lake Erie Link, Harbor Cable 
between New York and New Jersey, and Cross Sound Cable between New England and Long 
Island). It advertised its expertise in “Innovative solutions for power transmission … We have a 
singular focus on the technical, commercial and regulatory aspects of interconnections across 
state and national borders.” (www.transenergieus.com/projects.htm, accessed 18 November 
2003). In addition, buying for several such interconnectors could conceivably reduce the list-
price costs of equipment. 
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and demonstrate construction and operating experience with a new technology, 
imperfect foresight and perhaps public ownership seem to have been influencing 
factors. 
 
5. Potential failures of Australian regulated interconnectors  
 
a) Imperfect information 
 
SNI and its predecessor SANI originated in state government decisions to build 
interconnectors. The 1997 study by London Economics found that additional 
capacity was required to meet demand growth in SA, and that an interconnector 
would be less costly than new generation. Other studies around this time 
supported this conclusion. But NEMMCO’s formal review in June 1998 found that 
the SANI project was not justified under the original regulatory test, which 
referred to net benefits to customers. The test was revised to require that the 
proposed investment maximised the total net present value of the benefits to all 
who produce, distribute and consume electricity in the NEM. On 6 December 
2001 NEMMCO accepted that a revised version of SNI satisfied the revised test. 
 
SNI was never actually built. An equivalent project was evaluated as part of the 
ACCC’s subsequent consideration of Murraylink’s request for regulated status. 
The ACCC found that the SNI-equivalent project had the highest regulatory cost 
of all four transmission projects considered as alternatives to Murraylink. At 
$245m it exceeded the top end of the ACCC’s credible range of benefits ($170m 
to $220m) of an interconnector. Together with Murraylink’s actual experience as 
a lossmaker, this suggests that SNI would not have been an economic investment.  
 
Similar reservations were expressed about the regulated transmission line QNI. 
Consultants for the proponents estimated in 1997 that the total benefit would be 
$662m NPV, of which $571m (86%) derived from 750 MW of avoided generation 
capacity, of which approximately 450MW would be located in Queensland. Yet by 
2001 there were active proposals to build over ten times that much new 
generation capacity in Queensland. Not all of this would be constructed, but it 
cast doubt on how much generation the interconnector would avoid, and hence 
on the main reason why it was claimed to be economic. (Cook and Coxe 2001) 
 
QNI’s capacity was some four to five times that of DirectLink. It was estimated 
that QNI would require a sustained Pool price differential of about $5.50/MWh at 
full utilisation (about half the differential required by DirectLink) to achieve a 
commercial return on a merchant basis. In the event, QNI operated at about 50% 
utilisation in its early years, implying a need for a differential of about $11. The 
differential has fluctuated since then, in magnitude and even in sign, but never 
exceeding $11 and with an average absolute value of about $6 during 2001 to 
2010. 
 
The evidence thus suggests that imperfect information in the form of over-
optimistic estimates of future price differentials was a significant problem for 
both the regulated interconnectors – at least, to the extent that their decisions 
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reflected serious attempts to make economic investments. The actual objectives 
of regulated interconnectors are discussed further below. 
 
 
b) Bureaucratic processes 
 
A Memorandum of Understanding to examine the feasibility of an interconnector 
between the state-owned electricity corporations in NSW and SA was first signed 
in September 1994. After industry restructuring, a further such Memorandum 
was signed in August 1996 between the successor transmission entities 
TransGrid and ETSA Transmission. In June 1998 the quasi-regulatory body 
NEMMCO held that their proposed interconnector SANI did not pass the 
regulatory test. TransGrid submitted a revised application SNI on 29 October 
1998 but on 30 July 1999 requested NEMMCO to suspend consideration of SNI 
pending finalisation of a revised regulatory test. TransGrid revised the design of 
SNI and on 6 March 2000 requested that the evaluation recommence. On 19 
September 2001 a draft subcommittee report advised that SNI still did not 
satisfy the regulatory test. In October 2001 TransGrid further revised SNI to 
include more transmission reinforcement works in NSW.  On 6 December 2001 
NEMMCO confirmed that SNI now satisfied the regulatory test. On 21 December 
2001 Murraylink applied to the National Electricity Tribunal for a review of this 
decision. On 31 October 2002 the Tribunal upheld NEMMCO’s decision by a 2-1 
majority. On 28 November 2002 Murraylink secured a judicial review of the 
Tribunal’s decision. On 24 July 2003 the Victoria Supreme Court held in favour of 
the Tribunal on most grounds but in favour of Murraylink’s appeal on two quite 
fundamental grounds, and remitted the decision back to the Tribunal for 
reconsideration.  
 
The bureaucratic process for this regulated interconnector was indeed thus 
characterised by costly and time-consuming decision-making.  Ten years after an 
interconnector was first mooted, and six years after SANI/SNI was proposed, 
there was still no decision as to whether it could go ahead. It was simply 
overtaken by events. The process was also characterised by costly legal appeals 
and reviews. In contrast, the merchant interconnector Murraylink was in 
commercial operation 3 ½ years after it was announced. 
 
The process went more smoothly in the case of QNI, but was still time-
consuming. An interconnector was first proposed in the early 1990s. The state 
governments of NSW and Queensland approved QNI in 1997, just before the 
National Electricity Code took effect, so that it was not subject to the same 
regulatory regime as SNI. Construction began in 1998. QNI went into initial 
operation in February 2001 and was scheduled to reach full capacity in 2002. 
This was about five years after the decision to build. Part of this reflects its larger 
size, but even so, the period was much longer than for the merchant 
interconnector DirectLink, which took about two years from announcement to 
commercial operation.  
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c) Construction costs and conservatism in technology 
 
The differences between these four transmission projects suggest that regulated 
state-owned transmission companies are not as sensitive to the costs of large 
and time-consuming projects as are privately owned merchant transmission 
providers. Compare Murraylink as a 220MW 180km merchant interconnector 
costing somewhat over $177m including undergrounding, with SNI as a 250MW 
regulated interconnector over a length about double Murraylink’s, which the 
ACCC estimated would cost around $245m. (This included about 30km 
undergrounding – Murraylink argued that SNI would need more than that.) And 
compare DirectLink as a 180MW 65km merchant interconnector costing some 
$130m including undergrounding, with QNI as a 1000MW 550km regulated 
interconnector with no undergrounding and costing some $350m. 
 
The two regulated interconnectors used existing technologies. As noted, the two 
merchant interconnectors used novel technologies. 
 
d) Interest group pressures 
 
The incumbent state-owned transmission company TransGrid was evidently 
keen to protect and expand its operations and network capacity. The Tribunal 
Minority report commented that TransGrid’s method of assessing projects would 
favour gold-plating.10 At the same time TransGrid resisted incursion by the new 
entrant Murraylink. It is an interesting question whether TransGrid’s conduct 
was consistent with its statutory objectives to operate efficient facilities for 
electricity transmission and to promote access to those facilities. Remarkably, in 
his evidence to the Tribunal, the Minister for Energy in NSW noted that those 
objectives did not impose any duties on TransGrid, hence expressed “no more 
than aspirations or ideals which are not enforceable by a court”.  
 
The influence of customer interests is intriguing. The original Customer Benefits 
Test was “designed to ensure that network investment would only be 
undertaken if customers benefited from that investment”. In June 1998, finding 
that the SANI interconnector did not pass the test, NEMMCO noted certain 
problems with the test, and took the view that “the test, as it stood, might make it 
difficult for any inter-regional augmentation to satisfy the criterion”. The ACCC, 
under pressure from NSW government, was asked “to recommend changes to the 
test to overcome the perceived inadequacies”. Its consultants Ernst & Young 
pointed out that in some circumstances a test limited to customer benefits would 
actually be easier for a transmission augmentation to pass because the loss of 
generator monopoly profit would be ignored. Nevertheless, ACCC proposed a 
change to a Regulatory Test based on net public benefits or market benefits 
instead of net customer benefits, and this was implemented. 
                                                 
10 The Minority report drew attention to the failure to make valid comparisons between 
investments of different sizes, and the failure to distinguish between early occurring and more 
uncertain late occurring benefits. “Failure to make such adjustments for comparability will … 
systematically favour large projects, and so promote gold-plating”. The failure to account for 
temporal uncertainty “is also likely to – and in the case of the sort of network investments under 
consideration here, very likely, and in this particular case would – lead to gold plating.” 
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When it came to the regulated interconnector QNI in Queensland, consumer 
group pressure put the case for a regulated interconnector based on the benefits 
to customers, not on net public benefits or market benefits. For example, it was 
argued that “had DirectLink been the only interconnection, and had it been used 
to maintain a pool price differential of $11/MWh, Queensland, with 42,000 GWh 
of generation, would have sustained additional wholesale pool costs of over $460 
million per year, enough to pay for the installation of QNI in just 12 months of 
operation.” (Booth 2003 pp 220-1) This $460m is the approximate annual gain to 
Queensland customers.11 But against this there would have been an 
approximately equal reduction in revenues to Queensland generators. (There 
would also have been higher prices in NSW, paid by customers there and 
received by generators there.) By the criterion of net public benefit, a regulated 
interconnector investment decision made on the basis of gains to Queensland 
customers would have been seriously inefficient. 
 
e) Political influence 
 
Until the early 1990s, each state in Australia owned its own electricity system, 
and there was little interconnection or desire for it. Thereafter, NSW was keen to 
promote interconnection in order to export its surplus generation, which meant 
greater revenues for the state-owned generators and their owner. A taskforce in 
Queensland, looking for it to join the NEM and restructure and privatise, 
proposed that the Government should construct a large interconnection with 
NSW, focusing on northward flow from NSW “to discipline generators in 
Queensland”. South Australia, having suffered a blackout in 1993, was initially 
keen to construct a second interconnector to NSW, but when it decided to 
privatise the sector it withdrew its support. The original motivations for the 
regulated interconnectors were thus political as much as economic responses to 
the piecemeal privatisation and opening of the national electricity market.  
 
Further political involvement included public commitments at Ministerial level 
and by the NEM Ministers Forum to greater interconnection between the States. 
The SA government pressed for action “to remove whatever road blocks there 
are and take some tough decisions on getting interconnectors in place”. 
Construction of the (duplicate) regulated interconnector between SA and 
NSW/Victoria became an election commitment in South Australia. At the national 
level, the Council of Australian Governments commissioned a review whose 
outcome (Parer Report, December 2002) was very critical of arrangements for 
transmission. In the light of it, the Ministerial Council on Energy endorsed a 
package of radical reforms to electricity market regulation, not least of 
interconnectors, on 11 December 2003.12 
                                                 
11 It is approximate because in some hours the differential in prices would be even more than 
$11, even with DirectLink assumed to operate at full capacity, and in some other hours the 
differential would be less than $11, even with DirectLink assumed to restrict flow. 
12 The package included amendments to the Regulatory Test. It agreed the creation of a new 
Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) with a last resort planning power to direct that 
inter-connection projects be subjected to the new Regulatory Test, and a new Australian Energy 
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The NSW Government, with a direct financial interest, was particularly 
interventionist. In 1999 it placed the regulatory test on NEMMCO’s issues 
register, meaning that the NEM could not commence until the issue was resolved 
to NSW’s satisfaction. In 2001 a telephone call from the NSW Minister’s 
consultant adviser sought to put pressure on NEMMCO.13 In 2002 the NSW 
Minister submitted evidence to the Tribunal. In 2003 the NSW Government, 
along with the SA Government and TransGrid, filed an appeal against the Victoria 
Supreme Court judgement.  
 
f) Multiple regulatory jurisdictions 
 
The experience of SNI illustrates how three different regulatory agencies in the 
appeal chain approached regulated transmission in different ways. In two out of 
three cases the approach was clearly inadequate. 
 
The National Market Management Company NEMMCO was the first quasi-
regulatory agency in the process. In December 2001 it accepted that a revised 
version of SNI passed the Regulatory Test. This required that the project 
maximise the net present value of total benefits to all who produce, distribute 
and consume electricity in the National Electricity Market. Appeal to the National 
Electricity Tribunal revealed that SNI passed the Test on the basis of modelling 
showing SNI with a discounted present cost of $98.4m and discounted present 
benefits of $264.5m, hence a net present benefit of $166.1m. The calculations 
assumed that Murraylink would be in operation.14  
 
However, later examination in front of the Tribunal (by which time Murraylink 
had been built) revealed that SNI could be considered as two separate 
components. One component, which became known as ‘Unbundled SNI’, 
comprised various reinforcements of the transmission system in NSW; this had a 
cost of $41.2m and benefits of $351.4m, hence a net benefit of $310.2m. The 
other component was the interconnector part of SNI, which had a cost of $57.2m 
and negative benefits of $86.9m, hence a net cost of $144.1m. The reason for 
these negative benefits was never explored.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Regulator (AER) to perform all national energy market regulation functions. It proposed to 
abolish the National Electricity Tribunal. 
13 “It is also alleged that, in the course of that conversation, Mr Price [the adviser] told Mr George 
or Mr Bones [of NEMMCO] that if NEMMCO did not make a determination that in its opinion the 
proposal [SNI] was justified, there was a possibility that NSW might withdraw from the NEM. 
There is some dispute about what was actually said in this conversation. The Tribunal accepts 
that Mr Price made a telephone call and insisted that a decision by NEMMCO be made quickly and 
that the Minister wanted a decision which favoured TransGrid’s application.” National Electricity 
Tribunal, In the matter of an application of Review  of a NEMMCO determination on the SNI 
interconnector dated 6 December 2001, Majority Decision, pp 41-2. 
14 The precise numbers depended on the assumptions and scenarios used. The results presented 
here are for the Base Case using what TransGrid’s consultants IES called Realistic Bidding 
Scenario 2 which IES considered “the most realistic of the three bidding scenarios used in the 
modelling”.  
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The evidence now suggested that a duplicate interconnector did not have a 
positive net value. It was also apparent that TransGrid’s various earlier 
modifications to SNI to include more reinforcement works in NSW had swung 
the value of the total bundle from negative to positive.  The fact that the 
distinction between the uneconomic interconnector SNI and the economic 
network reinforcement (Unbundled SNI) had escaped NEMMCO suggests that 
this quasi-regulator had not carried out a particularly probing economic analysis. 
The Minority Report to the Tribunal (see below) suggested that NEMMCO should 
have sought expert economic advice. The inability of the Tribunal as a body to 
realise what was happening, and to make or require an adequate economic 
appraisal of the regulated interconnector proposal, was a further serious defect 
in the regulatory framework. 
 
The obvious conclusion at this stage was that TransGrid should proceed with the 
network reinforcement (Unbundled SNI) and abandon what was now an 
uneconomic duplicate interconnector. The focus should have been on the design, 
pricing and financing of the system reinforcement, the provision in the most 
economic way of any necessary protection against risk to the incumbent 
transmission system, and the appraisal of any implications for competition. 
 
However, TransGrid resisted. It argued that Unbundled SNI was not 
commercially viable because it did not have a ‘proponent’. Moreover, such an 
investment would leave TransGrid subject to an unacceptable risk of asset 
stranding because Murraylink had market power and would have the ability and 
incentive to restrict the level of output over its own interconnector. This in turn 
would reduce the level of flow across Unbundled SNI, and the ACCC might 
therefore write down TransGrid’s assets as underutilised.  
 
In reply, Murraylink argued that it did not have this market power, that the risk 
to TransGrid was negligible, that Murraylink was willing to be a proponent of 
Unbundled SNI, and that any risk could more economically be dealt with by a 
commercial arrangement between TransGrid and Murraylink than by 
constructing the uneconomic duplicate interconnector SNI. 
 
The Minority member of the Tribunal (with stated expertise in engineering, 
economics and sociology) held that neither NEMMCO nor the Tribunal had 
carried out a full and proper cost benefit analysis as required by the regulatory 
test. The whole process was “fundamentally flawed”. Consequently SNI was not 
justified. The two Majority members (both lawyers) accepted TransGrid’s 
arguments. They held that its apprehension of risk was “real and not 
unreasonable”, and that Unbundled SNI was not commercially feasible hence was 
not an alternative to full SNI. So full SNI maximised the net value of benefits and 
therefore passed the regulatory test. In their view, there was no need to have 
regard to “general cost benefit principles at large”. 
 
On appeal, the Victoria Supreme Court rejected most of Murraylink’s complaints 
about the Tribunal’s failure to follow due process. It said that the Majority had 
adequate evidence on which to take a view about the cost benefit analysis 
provided, and was entitled to accept it. However, it found that the Tribunal had 
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erred in law by rejecting Unbundled SNI simply on the basis that TransGrid 
refused to be a proponent of it, and that the Tribunal had failed to explain why 
there was a significant risk of stranding if TransGrid constructed Unbundled SNI. 
TransGrid’s consultants had submitted evidence that if Murraylink was 
uncontracted there could be a restriction of 0.013312% of flow on Unbundled 
SNI (i.e. on the reinforced part of the transmission network). The judge opined 
that “My own uninformed view is that it is difficult to imagine that a restriction of 
0.013312%, or even a figure of 100 times that amount, could ever be regarded as 
more than negligible”. The Majority had failed to establish “whether a risk of 
restriction of that order of magnitude would so much deter an objective 
operator, acting rationally according to the economic criteria prescribed by the 
regulatory test, as to refuse to construct Unbundled SNI if [full] SNI were not 
approved.” 
 
When Murraylink applied for transfer to regulated status, the competition 
regulator ACCC did not insist that alternative projects have a proponent. But 
neither did it address all the concerns of the Minority Report about the previous 
inadequate analysis.15 The ACCC came out with quite different figures than 
TransGrid/NEMMCO. Amongst other things, in order to compare Murraylink 
against alternative projects, it re-evaluated the cost of the interconnector 
component of SNI16. As noted earlier, it assessed the cost of this alternative at 
$245m; this was in excess of the top end of what it considered a credible range of 
benefits of an interconnector ($170m - $220m). This compares to TransGrid’s 
consultants’ calculated cost of $57.2m and benefit of minus $86.9m that were 
used in the NEMMCO and Tribunal proceedings. The main reasons for the higher 
cost were an allowance for undergrounding about 30km of line for 
environmental reasons and the inclusion of other costs previously omitted e.g. 
for interest during construction and contingencies. The discrepancy in the 
modelling costs and benefits again casts doubt on the adequacy of NEMMCO’s 
earlier analysis, but also indicates the sensitivity of regulatory modelling results 
to the assumptions made. 
 
g) Regulatory resources and reliance on regulated firms 
 
NEMMCO’s initial appraisal of SNI was carried out by its Inter Regional Planning 
Committee (IRPC) and the latter’s consultants ROAM. However, there was much 
debate as to whether ROAM’s modelling was adequate, so TransGrid provided 
some further analysis by its own consultants IES. It was the IES modelling that 
provided the basis for NEMMCO’s erroneous conclusion (and for the 
deliberations of the Tribunal and the Supreme Court). 
 
In 2002 Murraylink applied for regulated status. The ACCC was required to 
calculate the benefit of an interconnector. It did not make its own calculations 
                                                 
15 The ACCC seems to have accepted broadly the same framework and approach as NEMMCO. It 
did not mention, or make adjustments to meet, two of the Minority’s main concerns, related to 
unequal capital expenditures or to the comparability of early more certain costs and later 
uncertain benefits. 
16 Actually, this was a somewhat shorter interconnector, comparable in length to Murraylink and 
excluding the section of SNI lying entirely within SA. 
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from scratch: with two small modifications, the ACCC accepted the calculations of 
Murraylink’s consultants. It was able to assess the costing of more alternative 
projects than NEMMCO did because Murraylink provided more alternative 
costings to assess.  
 
  
Table 1      Gross market benefits of the economic project ($m) 
Energy savings from enabling less expensive generation              77.0 
Deferred merchant entry (capital)                                                                                             49.0 
Deferred merchant entry (O&M)                     5.4 
Reliability (reductions in unserved energy, with VoLL = $10,000/MWh)            62.0 
Deferred transmission reinforcement in Riverland area               22.0 
Ditto (O&M)                         1.9 
Total                 $218m 
 
Table 1 shows the ACCC’s main calculation (called Alternative 3). The first three 
items, totalling about $131m and accounting for about 60% of the total benefits, 
could presumably be captured by a market investment. They would be 
associated with an annual revenue of about $11m. Prospective trading based on 
forward market curves suggested an income (and hence benefits) of about half 
that. But this comparison was not made. The last three items, totalling about 
$86m and accounting for about 40% of the total benefits, referred to magnitudes 
that were not recoverable or testable in the market.  
 
These calculations to assess regulatory transmission contrast with those that 
would be made to assess merchant transmission from a commercial perspective. 
The ability (or otherwise) to assess the economic viability of projects ex ante, 
and to check on performance ex post, and the incentive (or otherwise) to do 
these things, are systematically different. In a comparative analysis, this should 
be a significant factor in considering the pros and cons of each approach.17 
 
This concludes discussion of the two regulated interconnectors in Australia. In 
sum, the regulated interconnector SNI in NSW was characterised by all of the 
conjectured regulatory imperfections, and QNI in Queensland by several of them. 
 
6. Coordination and transactions costs  
 
J&T discuss the problems caused by strategic behaviour. One concern is that 
network expansions are likely to be lumpy. Building and operating a 
transmission line will narrow the pre-construction differentials in prices so that 
the remaining value that can be secured by construction understates the total 
value of the line. There is an under-incentive for a merchant investor to build the 
line.  
                                                 
17 Cf Coase (1946) on marginal cost pricing: “Neither Hotelling nor Learner nor Meade give, in my 
view, sufficient weight to the stimulus to correct forecasting, which comes from having a 
subsequent market test of whether consumers are willing to pay the total cost of the product. Nor 
do they recognize the importance of the aid which the results of this market test give in enabling 
more accurate forecasts to be made in the future.” (p 84) 
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But is it not possible for the exporting generators and the importing customers, 
who both benefit from these narrowed price differentials, to support 
construction of the line? Similarly with the concern that a socially more valuable 
merchant line would be pre-empted by a less valuable investment in generation: 
why would those who would lose out from this investment just sit back and let it 
happen? 
 
Another concern is gaming between complementary merchant investments. J&T 
give an example of two complementary interconnector projects, one from the 
North to the Middle and one from the Middle to the South. The profitability of 
each depends critically upon the capacity of the other, since the one with the 
lower capacity receives all the congestion rent. Hence, they say, neither 
interconnector dares to move first.  
 
But why do the two interconnectors fail to resolve this issue before construction 
begins? Or why does one merchant interconnector not build the whole line? It is 
said that “While this pair is really a single investment from an economic 
viewpoint, the investments may be undertaken by different entities for 
technological reasons [different expertise] or other reasons [e.g. separate 
ownership of rights of way].” (p. 250) Does the concept of a consortium not exist 
in this world? 
 
J&T reply as follows. “It is sometimes argued that the problems created by lumpy 
investments can be resolved through negotiations between the various market 
participants who will benefit from the investment; that is, that the ‘Coase 
theorem’ applies. There are many reasons … to believe that negotiations among 
the affected market participants is unlikely to solve the problems”. These 
reasons are: the costs of transacting especially when the number of stakeholders 
is large; asymmetric information so that participants may end up being too 
greedy resulting in bargaining breakdown; absence of future players whose 
interests are not taken into account; non-excludability of winners and free-
riding; and holdup of potential losers. 
 
All these failures are theoretically possible, but are they common in practice? 
Coase himself has argued not.18 In their earlier discussion paper, J&T refer to a 
piece of empirical evidence on this point. “Mechanisms designed to aggregate 
stakeholder preferences to make choices about major transmission investments 
have not been particularly successful.” (Joskow and Tirole 2003 p 51) They cite 
Chisari et al (2001) for a discussion of experience in Argentina (a reference that 
remains in the published paper). The next section examines this experience. 
 
                                                 
18 On the ‘greedy’ point, and in answer to Samuelson’s assertion that bargaining would not 
necessarily end up on the contract curve, he comments “[w]e observe that raw materials, 
machinery, land, and buildings are bought and sold … We do not usually seem to let the problem 
of the division of the gain stand in the way of making an agreement. Nor is this surprising. Those 
who find it impossible to conclude agreements will find that they neither buy nor sell and 
consequently will usually have no income. Traits which lead to such an outcome have little 
survival value….” Coase (1988) p 162 
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7. Coordination and transactions costs: evidence from 
Argentina 
 
Argentina provides a good opportunity to compare regulated and merchant 
transmission - in the latter case what might now be called ‘private initiative’ 
transmission. Until privatisation and restructuring in 1992, transmission was 
provided by state-owned companies subject to ‘regulation’ by the government. In 
terms of the regulatory imperfections identified above, the regime was 
characterised above all by interest group capture and political influence. This 
manifested itself in excessive operating costs and capital investment, with prices 
held down to combat inflation. Inter alia, long and expensive transmission lines 
were repeatedly constructed without economic justification, and their utilisation 
rates were very low. (Littlechild and Skerk 2008a) 
 
Reform was designed to address these problems in a radical way. The industry 
was privatised. To prevent regulatory capture, all major transmission (500kV) 
and sub-transmission (132kV) investment was required to be on what we might 
now call a private initiative or merchant basis. Market participants who were 
beneficiaries, rather than the transmission company or the regulator, had to 
propose, vote for and pay for all major expansions. Approved expansions were 
then put out to competitive tender to build and operate. This was known as the 
Public Contest method.  
 
Argentine experience with a ‘beneficiary pays’ approach is of particular 
significance today. Variants of this approach have recently been adopted by New 
York ISO19 and by FERC itself in its Order 1000 (FERC 2011b). 
 
The question of interest here is whether this merchant basis of transmission was 
subject to the potential imperfections identified by J&T. In particular, was it 
vulnerable to the lack of coordination and transaction cost weaknesses? 
 
Soon after the new policy was implemented, a Fourth Line from the gas-
producing area of Comahue to the capital Buenos Aires was proposed but 
rejected by a majority of market participants. This line was allegedly much-
needed, and had been widely canvassed under the previous regime. The 
rejection was perceived as evidence that the Public Contest method did not and 
could not work. It seemed that transactions costs outweighed the advantages of 
cooperation between market participants. This was the conclusion drawn from 
the cited paper of Chisari et al (2001). 
 
Subsequent and more detailed research has shown that the Fourth Line was 
expensive, premature and uneconomic. (Littlechild and Skerk 2008b) Delaying 
its construction was evidence that the Public Contest method did work, not that 
it didn’t work. In the short term, the participants agreed instead to expand 
                                                 
19 See FERC (2008) for the Order accepting NYISO’s filing, NYISO (2010a) especially s 2.2 giving a 
summary of the process, NYISO (2010b) especially ss 31.3 and 31.4 on cost allocation and s 
31.4.3.6 on beneficiary voting provisions. I am grateful to Rana Mukerji and John Buechler of 
NYISO for these references. See also Hogan (2011) for discussion of cost allocation principles and 
possible calculations. 
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capacity by installing capacitors, at a fraction of the cost of a new line. When 
conditions later made the Fourth Line attractive, the participants worked 
together well to design, propose and pay for a line that attracted almost 
unanimous support and was constructed at a significantly lower cost than 
envisaged in the initial rejected proposal. Subsequently, it became apparent that 
it was more economic to transport gas from Comahue to Buenos Aires, and build 
the power stations there, than to build more long-distance transmission lines. 
 
More generally, the Public Contest method enabled substantial investment in 
better transmission control systems in Argentina. (Littlechild and Skerk 2008d) 
Over the period 1993 to 2003 system demand increased by over 50%. During 
that period transmission line length increased by 20%, mains transformer 
capacity by 21%, compensators by 27% and substations by 37%, but series 
capacitors by 105%. This more than doubled transmission capacity limits, more 
than sufficient to meet the increased demand, and more economically than by 
building more transmission lines. 
 
The Public Contest method has been used extensively, even after the serious 
problems associated with the economic crisis of 2001 and subsequent events. As 
of 2007, 36 proposals had been made, some with variants making a total of 40 
proposed major expansions. Of these 40, 35 were accepted and all those were 
implemented. The four largest Public Contest expansions ranged from $25m to 
$247m. There were also other methods of transmission expansion, and from 
1994 to the 2001 crisis the number and value of transmission investments 
steadily increased. Over this same period, all but 5 of the 163 transmission 
expansions, accounting for all but $3m of the $809m total value, were voluntarily 
agreed by the users.20  
 
The voters for a particular expansion are the beneficiaries of that expansion, as 
identified by a simulation study carried out by the system operator (CAMMESA) 
using the so-called Area of Influence method. The beneficiaries/voters for each 
expansion are also the parties who pay for that expansion, in proportion to their 
benefits and votes. (Amongst other things, this addresses the problem of free-
riding.) The number of voters on each expansion ranged from 1 to 65 with a 
median of 5. Negotiations between market participants were generally not 
problematic, even though they included a wide variety of types and sizes of 
generation plants, distribution companies and large users. 
 
Approved expansions were put out to competitive tender. The number of bidders 
ranged up to 7, with a mean of 2.4 bids. This was sufficient to generate significant 
competition. Three quarters of the winning bids were below the minimum 
acceptable level specified by the parties. Independent contractors (at least 11 
different ones) won about three quarters of the contracts. The (revised) tender 
for the Fourth Line attracted 13 bids or variants. The users increasingly designed 
                                                 
20 The 5 exceptional cases were minor expansions (under $2m for the transmission system, 
under $1m for the sub-transmission systems), which the transmission companies themselves 
were responsible for proposing. Typically they were for the benefit of only one or two users. In 
the absence of agreement by these beneficiaries, the regulatory body ENRE was empowered to 
authorise investment and determine responsibility for payment. 
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the tenders in more sophisticated ways to maximise competition, and to enable 
bidders to focus on those areas where they would be most effective. Thus, 
tenders for new transformers might be divided into several modules: the 
provision of the transformer itself, the installation of the transformer plus minor 
expansions in the substation, equipment for metering and circuit breakers, etc. 
Competition had a significant effect on costs: the cost of building 500kV 
transmission lines roughly halved over the first five year period.  
 
It would be fair to say that the mechanism designed to aggregate stakeholder 
preferences to make choices about major transmission investments in Argentina 
was remarkably successful. It exhibited none of the five potential imperfections 
identified above. 21 
 
8. Network deepening investments in Argentina 
 
J&T suggest that network expansion investments (separate new links) can in 
principle be made by incumbents or others. However, they say that network 
deepening investments (physical upgrades of the incumbent’s existing network, 
such as capacitor banks and control equipment) and network maintenance can, 
as a practical matter, only be implemented efficiently by the owner of the 
existing lines. How did the Public Contest method address these practical 
difficulties in Argentina? 
 
Maintenance of transmission networks existing at the time of privatisation 
remained the responsibility of the incumbent transmission company, and was 
covered by an RPI-X price control. But both network expansion and network 
deepening investments were subject to the Public Contest method. As examples 
of the latter, several expansions did indeed install capacitors and control 
equipment.  
 
J&T give three reasons for their view. First, adding third-party facilities that are 
fully integrated with the existing network creates significant incentive problems, 
especially with heterogeneous transmission facilities. Writing and enforcing 
appropriate contracts would be difficult. Second, the difficulty of allocating the 
new capacity of the line between the original owner and the new investors 
would be a substantial obstacle to an effect third party access policy. In 
Argentina, these problems did not occur because the expansions are not 
dedicated to particular users: once installed they effectively become part of the 
incumbent’s system. In principle the winning bidder has to maintain the new 
equipment, but in practice the maintenance of system deepening investments 
was usually subcontracted to the incumbent transmission owner.  
 
                                                 
21 Unfortunately, the situation changed after the economic crisis. Subsequent governments reintroduced 
regulated investment in the form of a Federal Transmission Plan. Predictably, this was characterised by 
the defects of the regulated approach, particularly political influence. In 2006 the Government’s 
estimated cost for implementing this Plan was more than double what the cost would have been under 
the Public Contest arrangements for merchant transmission. (Littlechild and Skerk 2008c) 
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The third reason given is that entrants are likely to have less information about 
existing transmission lines than their owners. In Argentina this issue was 
recognised and addressed in various ways. The incumbent transmission 
companies were obliged to indicate which major expansions were necessary in 
their view, and to provide relevant information. They themselves were 
responsible for proposing minor expansions. They had a role to ensure that 
expansions of their systems were properly implemented. They could, if they 
wished, bid to construct, operate and maintain the agreed expansions. It was in 
the interests of the network users to familiarise themselves with the state of the 
transmission network, including by liaising with the incumbent transmission 
companies, and in practice they did so. 
 
Some concerns were expressed that the Public Contest method might fail to 
secure investments needed to secure quality and reliability of supply. An 
investigation by the System Operator did not find clear examples of this. 
Nonetheless it was decided in 1998 to allow incumbent transmission companies 
(as well as beneficiaries) to propose certain quality and reliability of supply 
expansions. They were also allowed to initiate the previous kinds of expansions 
where this involved adding equipment to their existing facilities (e.g. a new 
transformer in an existing substation). The transmission companies had to 
provide additional information to justify these requests, and the proposals still 
had to be voted on. In the event, transmission companies did propose a series of 
expansions under this new provision, and the beneficiaries (often distribution 
companies) did indeed support most of them. 
 
9. Meshed networks in Argentina 
 
Rious (2006) has suggested that particular conditions in Argentina have allowed 
network investments to be put out to competition, namely that the transmission 
network is almost radial rather than meshed. He suggests that the Argentine 
experience may not be directly transposed to meshed networks as in Europe and 
the US where there are many inter-dependencies.  
 
It is true that the main Argentine transmission network is (or was) largely radial, 
but this is not the case with the five sub-transmission networks. When the sub-
transmission network in Buenos Aires province was privatised, there was a need 
to consider whether and how the Public Contest method could be adopted and 
used in a meshed network. The answer is that it could be and has been. 
(Littlechild and Ponzano 2008) 
 
In view of the interdependencies it was necessary to coordinate the various 
possible transmission expansions and to agree a long-term Transmission Plan 
that would reduce the regulatory burden and regulatory uncertainty. In 1999 the 
three provincial distribution companies and 11 of the largest municipal 
distributors (cooperatives) formed themselves into the Regional Electricity 
Forum of Buenos Aires (FREBA). The transmission and sub-transmission 
companies were made advisory members. Over time other cooperatives joined, 
and by 2006 the association had 174 members responsible for supplying some 
95% of demand in the province. They appointed a technical committee to 
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identify and evaluate transmission investment projects for subsequent voting. 
They took into account the Reference Guide that the transmission and sub-
transmission companies were required to provide with suggested expansions to 
maintain quality of service over the next 8 years. FREBA and the transmission 
and sub-transmission companies worked together and generally resolved their 
differences. FREBA was then able to produce an agreed Ten Year Transmission 
Expansion Plan. The provincial government approved the collection of a special 
tariff from final customers to fund this. (The last is an element of the framework 
comparable to the regulated investment approach.) 
 
It was also necessary to agree how the costs would be shared out among users. 
The Area of Influence method used to identify beneficiaries did not extend down 
beyond the 132kV network. It therefore failed to identify as beneficiaries the 
municipal distributors embedded at 66kV and below. A mechanism was needed 
for taking account of the views and needs of these users. In addition, the main 
distribution companies were concerned about free-riding. Accordingly, FREBA 
proposed a method (Resolution about Contributors) to extend the Area of 
Influence method. 
 
Experience to date is that transactions costs have not been a problem. The 
Transmission Plan was unanimously approved, so there has been no need to vote 
on separate projects. The Plan began to be implemented, but the economic crisis 
and subsequent government policy on price controls held up the raising of 
necessary funds. This in turn led to a search for more ingenious ways of 
financing. The approach provided advantages over a regulated approach. FREBA 
looked further ahead than the transmission company was required to do. It 
carried out a more comprehensive analysis that better integrated the 
distribution networks into the picture. The chosen expansions were more 
economic, and better attuned to the needs of users, than those that the sub-
transmission company had identified. The process led to better relations, trust 
and understanding among the parties. 
 
10. Evidence from North America 
 
A review of regulated and merchant transmission in the US is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, some evidence can be brought to bear on the fourth 
alleged market failure, namely, the suggestion that transactions costs would 
result in an inability to address problems associated with coordination and the 
aggregation of stakeholder preferences, and negotiations between market 
participants. The presumed inability of transmission providers and users with 
very diverse interests to resolve these issues is suggested as a drawback of a 
merchant transmission approach. 
 
Interstate pipelines and transmission companies file rate cases before the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The various different users and 
other interested parties – distribution companies, generators, retail providers, 
state public utility commissions, large industrial users, customer representatives, 
etc - register as intervenors and submit their views and testimony. In practice, 
however, the cases are typically not litigated and decided upon by FERC. About 
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90% of these rate cases are settled by the parties themselves. Despite their many 
different interests, and over a considerable range of participant numbers and 
company sizes, the parties are almost always able to agree on a range of often 
contentious issues. In addition, the settlements are frequently characterised by 
innovations and other mutually agreed features that would not appear in a 
regulated outcome. (Littlechild 2011)  
 
Such negotiated settlements are not limited to transmission cases at FERC: they 
are frequently found in electricity and telecommunications cases at certain state 
commissions such as Florida. (Littlechild 2009a,b) They are now standard 
practice with oil and gas pipelines before the National Energy Board (NEB) in 
Canada. (Doucet and Littlechild 2009) 
 
This is not to say that the regulatory framework is irrelevant. Before approving a 
settlement, the regulatory body has to consider any objections and satisfy itself 
that it meets the statutory criteria. It may decide to modify the agreement. In 
negotiating an agreement the parties clearly have an eye to what they think the 
regulatory body would decide in the event that they are not able to negotiate an 
agreement. They may find it more difficult to reach agreement if there is not 
adequate regulatory precedent.  
 
The regulatory commissions take different stances with respect to facilitating 
settlement. The Florida Public Service Commission seems to leave the parties to 
negotiate on their own; that indeed was the parties’ own preference. In Canada 
the NEB for several years annually set a generic cost of capital formula that 
indicated what value the NEB would choose if called upon, thereby seeking to 
facilitate agreement on potentially the most controversial issue. In the US, FERC 
actively facilitates the settlement process insofar as its Trial Staff propose a first 
settlement agreement based on standard cost of service ratemaking, then seek to 
bring the parties together and reconcile differences.  
 
Thus, transactions costs and other potential difficulties such as conflicting 
interests have not generally been an obstacle to negotiating a settlement 
between the provider of transmission services and the users of that facility. And 
the regulatory framework has facilitated those negotiations in various ways. 
 
11. Conclusions on evidence 
 
Choosing between merchant and regulated transmission is a matter of choosing 
between imperfect alternatives. The economic literature generally, and the more 
focused debate on alternative transmission policies, suggest five main factors as 
potential disadvantages of each mode of delivery. Which factors are most 
important in practice?  
 
In Australia, the two merchant interconnectors may have suffered from 
imperfect information but were not characterised by market power or the other 
four alleged market imperfections. In contrast, the regulated interconnector SNI 
in NSW was characterised by all of the conjectured regulatory imperfections, and 
QNI in Queensland by several of them.  In Argentina, merchant transmission was 
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made mandatory because of the observed weaknesses of previously-regulated 
transmission. Contrary to initial impressions, this merchant framework worked 
well: there were productive negotiations between transmission users that 
resulted in commissioning needed transmission expansions, of all kinds and 
sizes, without undue transactions costs. Similarly, in various US and Canadian 
jurisdictions, transmission companies and their customers often find it possible 
and indeed advantageous to negotiate settlements rather than leave this to the 
regulatory commissions to decide. They do this to avoid the time and cost of 
bureaucratic processes, and because they can achieve outcomes that are better 
informed and better reflect the preferences of the parties themselves.   
 
In sum, market power, transactions costs and various other conjectured 
limitations might be serious problems for merchant transmission in theory – but 
in the cases we have examined they were not serious in practice. Bureaucratic 
processes, interest group capture, political influence and regulatory resource 
limitations might be serious problems for regulated transmission in theory – and 
in the cases we examined they indeed often were serious in practice.  
 
Imperfect information is a significant challenge for both modes of delivery. The 
problem is not asymmetric information as usually presented, whereby the 
regulated company knows what its costs and demands are but does not tell the 
regulator. Rather, the problem is a lack of coordination between all those parties 
potentially involved. Those who propose to build new transmission, and those 
who must approve such building, need to be confident that generators and final 
users will have sufficient demand in future to warrant the investment. This 
applies not only to each potential interconnector as a whole but also to each 
detail such as location, size, timing etc. And similarly, those who propose to build 
or use new generation need to be confident that the necessary transmission 
facilities will be in place. 
 
The consequence of a lack of coordination is the likelihood that transmission 
investments will be uneconomic: too much too soon, or too little too late, or in 
the wrong place, etc. Such mis-investment will be costly to those market 
participants that pay the immediate costs, and ultimately to taxpayers and/or 
customers in general.  
 
12. Implications for policy 
 
There is obviously useful scope for analysis of more recent experience with 
merchant and regulated transmission, especially in the US and Europe. If the 
analysis and evidence bear out present findings, they suggest certain directions 
for policy.  
 
First, given that the predicted and observed limitations of regulation can impact 
adversely on both regulated and merchant transmission, it is important to create 
the most fruitful conditions for effective competition and regulation. For 
example, a well-proved elementary building block is to establish transmission 
companies in separate ownership rather than as part of a vertically-integrated 
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electricity company. (Léautier and Thelen 2009) Also, private companies are 
more effectively regulated than state-owned ones. 
 
Second, there is scope to improve the professionalism and independence of 
relevant regulatory bodies. It might be argued that there have been 
improvements since some of the early experience described above, but the 
evidence is not always convincing. 22 This is not to argue for more regulation – 
there is scope to reduce it, including as explained below - but for more focused 
regulation with adequate access to the necessary resources. 
 
Third, since regulatory failure appears more pervasive than market failure in the 
transmission sector, and since merchant transmission – including private 
initiative schemes that do not depend entirely on revenues from spot price 
differentials - is viable and efficient in a greater range of circumstances than 
previously recognized, it is sensible to remove barriers to merchant transmission 
wherever possible. Depending on the circumstances, regulatory measures may 
be needed to support this: for example, to establish, monitor and enforce 
obligations on incumbent transmission companies with respect to the provision 
of access and information, to require outsourcing or competitive tendering, to 
require or suggest appropriate bases of cost-sharing, to facilitate auctions or 
negotiations among market participants, etc. 
 
Fourth, given the fundamental challenge of obtaining and coordinating 
information about the costs and benefits of transmission investment, a key 
question is whether merchant or regulated transmission is better able to 
discover and coordinate the information most relevant to taking and 
implementing major transmission investment decisions. Which approach is 
better able to incentivise and coordinate the providers and customers of the 
potential interconnectors, so as to secure the appropriate investment with the 
minimum of risk? Which approach is better able to discover the kinds of 
commitment and incentive and risk sharing mechanisms, on both sides of the 
market, that will be most appropriate, acceptable and effective in the particular 
circumstances of each potential interconnector?  
 
The general presumption, based upon several centuries of experience as well as 
economic analysis, is that markets are better mechanisms for learning, discovery 
and incentives than are regulatory bodies. This is not to say that there is no role 
for regulation. Rather, regulation would be better employed establishing a 
framework within which the market can operate effectively. Specifically, 
regulation would seek as far as possible to facilitate the development of 
transmission lines that reflect agreement on size, timing, location and charges, 
etc, rather than take all these decisions itself.  
 
A central argument of this paper is that transmission investment projects and 
their costs and benefits are not known and given, certainly not to regulators but 
not to market participants either. A key task is to search for, discover and indeed 
                                                 
22 A previous NSW regulator says that the present framework is “very close to broken”. (Tom 
Parry, “Lawyers’ picnic drives up the cost of electricity”, The Australian, June 29, 2011) See also 
Parry and Duffy (2010), Mountain and Littlechild (2010), Mountain (2011). 
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create transmission investments that at least increase net benefits. To achieve 
this, it is necessary to discover or design the incentive-maximising and risk-
sharing contractual arrangements most favourable to the successful 
coordination of such investment. Due regard must be had to the implications for 
competition and to the possibility of coordination across each region as a whole. 
But both analysis and experience suggest that competitive, merchant or private 
initiative approaches are more effective than regulation in the process of 
discovering and creating mutually advantageous transmission investments. A 
more effective role for regulation is to assist rather than to replace, prevent or 
thwart this process. 
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